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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and ALBERT 
CHARBONEAU, an individual, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a 
Nevada limited partners! 
MARK CHILTON; KATHRYN W. 
CHILTON; ROGER S. TROUNDAY 
GAIL TROUNDAY; WARD W. 
CHILTON; and STEVEN R. 
TROUNDAY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890376 
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BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, MARK CHILTON, 
KATHRYN W. CHILTON, ROGER S. TROUNDAY, GAIL TROUNDAY, 
WARD W. CHILTON, and STEVEN R. TROUNDAY 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court • : 
Appellant ,s , h i i r I u < i I up 
("CharboiK-i i In n I h.i • .tauJ;-.i*, isSes 
rbom-'tiu 
i :. :• for' the 
recovery :• payments made on a real estate contract to which 
-1-
they were not parties and for which they have not received an 
assignment from the purchaser? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
Appellants Shire and Charboneau initiated this action 
against Frontier Investments and its individual partners 
(collectively "Frontier") to recover payments made to Frontier 
pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property. The 
contract was entered into between Frontier as seller and Steven 
T. Glezos ("Glezos") as buyer. After Frontier and Glezos 
entered into the contract, Glezos allegedly entered into an 
oral agreement with Shire and Charboneau under which Glezos and 
Shire and Charboneau agreed to purchase the property as a joint 
venture. Frontier was not a party to this alleged oral 
agreement. 
After making payments of $90,725.11, Glezos defaulted 
on the contract by failing to make a payment of $83,744.00, 
when due. In accordance with the terms of the* sales contract, 
Frontier terminated the contract, retook possession of the 
property, and retained the payments previously made on the 
contract. 
Shire and Charboneau then filed this action claiming 
the liquidated damages clause and forfeiture provisions 
contained in the contract were unenforceable as an illegal 
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penalty. However, Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the 
sales contract and have not received an assignment of the 
contract. The lower court accordingly granted Frontier*s 
motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the 
grounds that Shire and Charboneau lack standing to bring this 
action. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about October 22, 1984, Frontier entered 
into a written real estate contract with Glezos under which 
Glezos agreed to purchase .841 acres of real property located 
in Wendover, Elko County, Nevada, for a total purchase price of 
$126,150.00. (R. 70-71) 
2. On or about November 1, 1984, Frontier entered 
into a second real estate contract (the "Contract") with Glezos 
under which Glezos agreed to purchase a larger parcel of 
property containing 5.997 acres which included the original 
parcel described in the October contract. This Contract 
terminated the earlier contract and gave credit to Glezos for 
the amounts paid under the earlier contract. The purchase 
price of the property under the Contract was $765,494.00. 
(R. 71) 
3. Both contracts were entered into solely between 
Frontier and Glezos. In entering into the contracts, Frontier 
dealt solely with Glezos and intended to and has looked solely 
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to Glezos for performance. Frontier did not negotiate or 
contract with either Shire or Charboneau. (R. Ill) 
4. Paragraph 13 of the Contract provides in 
pertinent part: 
In the event Buyer defaults in performing this 
Contract or defaults in making any payment ... 
and such default is not cured within thirty (30) 
days after written notice by Seller specifying 
the default ... the Seller, at Seller's option 
shall have the following remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right to 
terminate this Contract and forfeit all 
the rights of the Buyer hereunder and 
in and to the property sold and to be 
released from all obligations in law 
and in equity to convey the property 
sold or any portion thereof, and all 
payments which have been made 
theretofore on this Contract by the 
Buyer shall be forfeited to the Seller 
as liquidated damages for the 
nonperformance of this Contract.... 
(R. 103) 
5. At sometime after Frontier and Glezos entered 
into the Contract, Glezos allegedly entered into an oral 
agreement with Shire and Charboneau to purchase the property as 
a joint venture. (R. 3) 
6. Frontier had no knowledge of the oral agreement 
entered into between Glezos and Shire and Charboneau, did not 
participate in any of the negotiations leading to the 
agreement, and was not a party to the agreement. (R. 113) 
7. Under the terms of the Contract, a payment of 
$83,744.00 became due on February 20, 1985. Glezos did not 
make the payment when it became due. (R. 4, 40) 
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8. By letter dated March 28, 1985, Frontier elected 
to and did terminate the Contract and retained all funds 
previously paid thereon. (R. 4, 40) 
9. On or about August 29, 1985, Glezos initiated an 
action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah against Frontier seeking to recover a portion of the 
payments paid to Frontier pursuant to the terms of the 
Contract. (R. 112) 
10. In September 1986, Shire and Charboneau moved to 
intervene as plaintiffs in the United States District Court 
action by filing a proposed complaint in invention together 
with a motion and lengthy memorandum. (R. 112) 
11. Frontier incurred considerable expense preparing 
and filing a memorandum in opposition to the motion for leave 
to intervene only to have the motion withdrawn by Shire and 
Charboneau without any explanation being provided to Frontier. 
(R. 112) 
12. In or about September 1987, Frontier and Glezos 
settled the dispute that was the basis of the United States 
District Court action and stipulated to an order of dismissal. 
On October 20, 1987, the United States District Court entered 
an order dismissing the action against Frontier. (R. 112) 
13. Plaintiffs Shire and Charboneau filed the instant 
action on or about February 29, 1988. (R. 2) 
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14. On August 4, 1989, the lower court entered 
summary judgment dismissing Shire and Charboneau's complaint. 
(R. 180) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A provision of a contract can only be challenged by a 
party to the contract, an intended beneficiary of the contract, 
or an assignee of a party to the contract. Shire and 
Charboneau were not parties to the contract, were not intended 
beneficiaries of the contract, and have not received an 
assignment from a party to the contract. The Agreement between 
Glezos and Shire and Charboneau dated September 25, 1986 does 
not constitute an assignment but is merely an agreement to 
share in the proceeds of any settlement or judgment obtained by 
Glezos from Frontier. Similarly, the alleged joint venture 
agreement violates the statute of frauds and does not 
constitute an assignment of Glezos? interest in the real 




THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
To determine whether summary judgment was properly 
entered, this Court should employ the same analytical standard 
as that of the trial court. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 
P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989). Summary judgment should 
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appropriately be entered if the pleadings and all other 
submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). Summary judgment should be denied only 
if there are genuine issues of "material" fact. "[T]he mere 
existence of genuine issue of fact in the case as a whole does 
not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are 
immaterial to the resolution of the case." Horgan v. 
Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). An 
issue of fact is material only if it could lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita 
Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
Shire and Charboneau assert that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there are issues of fact regarding 
whether the payments retained by Frontier as liquidated damages 
bear a reasonable relationship to Frontier's actual damages. 
Even assuming such issues exist, they are immaterial. Shire 
and Charboneau lack standing to even bring this action. Thus, 
we don't even get to the issue of damages. The lower court 
properly granted summary judgment. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT SHIRE AND 
CHARBONEAU LACK STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION 
Shire and Charboneau1s complaint alleges that the 
liquidated damages and forfeiture provisions of the Contract 
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are unenforceable as an illegal penalty. However, the validity 
of a provision in an agreement can only be challenged by a 
party to the agreement or by a party whom the contract was 
intended to benefit. Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, 
Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977); Wyatt v. Bowers, 747 
P.2d 881, 882 (Nev. 1987); Olsen v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360, 
1364 (Nev. 1975). Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the 
Contract and cannot claim to be intended beneficiaries of the 
Contract inasmuch as the alleged joint venture agreement was 
entered into subsequent to the Contract. 
Commercial Fixtures is closely on point. In that 
case, a real property owner leased the property to a lessee. 
The lessee then contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase 
of materials that were incorporated into a building on the 
leased premises. The owner was not a party to that agreement. 
When the lessee failed to pay for the materials the plaintiff 
sued the owner for the value of the materials under a theory of 
unjust enrichment. Because there was no contractual 
relationship between the owner and the plaintiff, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not recover. The 
Court ruled that the right of the plaintiff to recover against 
the owner "must be based upon an agreement." Id. at 774. 
Likewise in this case there is no contractual 
relationship between Frontier and Shire and Charboneau. 
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Shire's and Charboneaufs only agreement was with Glezos. Their 
remedy is thus against Glezos pursuant to the joint venture 
agreement. 
A. The Proceeds Sharing Agreement Dated September 
25, 1986 Between Glezos and Shire and Charboneau Does Not 
Constitute an Assignment. 
Shire and Charboneau argued below and again on appeal 
that they can maintain this action because they received an 
assignment of an interest in the Contract from Glezos. They 
claim the agreement dated September 25, 1986 between Glezos, 
Shire, and Charboneau (the "Proceeds Sharing Agreement"), a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1, constitutes a 
valid assignment of Glezos1 interest in the real property. 
This argument is meritless. 
The Proceeds Sharing Agreement does not purport to 
assign Glezos' interest in the property to Shire and 
Charboneau. It is merely an agreement to share the proceeds of 
any judgment or settlement obtained by Glezos against Frontier 
in the United States District Court action. In Hansen v. 
Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
the Utah Court of Appeals recently held language indicating 
that an assignment, transfer, conveyance, or assumption of an 
interest in real property is intended is necessary to create a 
valid assignment of a real estate contract. The Proceeds 
Sharing Agreement does not contain such language. 
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In Hansen, a seller of real property obtained a 
judgment and decree of foreclosure against the original buyer 
under the terms of a uniform real estate contract. The seller 
also attempted to obtain a judgment against a subsequent buyer 
who had purchased the property from the original buyer on a 
second uniform real estate contract. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed a dismissal of the seller's claims against the 
subsequent buyer, holding that the uniform real estate contract 
did not constitute an assignment of the original contract and 
that therefore there was no privity of contract between the 
seller and the subsequent buyer. The Court held that if the 
parties had intended an assignment, such a provision could have 
been stated in the contract with specificity. The Court 
stated: "Notably absent are the usual words of either an 
assumption or an assignment, such as 'assumes,1 'agrees to 
pay,' 'assigns,1 'transfers' or 'conveys.'" Id. The Court 
also stated: 
What we have in this case is a subpurchase 
by a subpurchaser by means of a subcontract. A 
subcontract by the [original purchaser] to sell 
to [the subsequent purchaser] under an executory 
land contract is not an assignment, but a 
separate, independent contract between them. The 
subpurchase creates between the orig;inal vendor 
and the [subsequent purchaser] privity of 
estate, but does not in the absence of 
agreement, create privity of contract between 
them. 
748 P.2d 1104 n.2 (emphasis in original). 
The Proceeds Sharing Agreement between Glezos, Shire, 
and Charboneau does not even constitute a subpurchase 
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agreement, let alone an assignment. The agreement contains no 
language indicating a transfer of an interest in real property 
is intended and is merely an agreement to share in the proceeds 
of the federal court lawsuit. 
Additionally, the Proceeds Sharing Agreement was 
entered into after Glezos had forfeited his interest in the 
property to Frontier under the terms of the Contract. At the 
time the Proceeds Sharing Agreement was entered into, Glezos 
had no interest in the property to assign. 
B. The Oral Joint Venture Agreement Is Not A Valid 
Assignment. 
Shire and Charboneau also claim that the oral joint 
venture agreement somehow "by operation of law" constitutes an 
assignment of Glezos? interest in the real property. This 
argument fails for several reasons. First, oral assignments 
are invalid under both the Utah and Nevada statutes of 
frauds.1 The Utah statute of frauds provides in pertinent 
part : 
No estate or interest in real property ... 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by ... deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same.... 
1
 There is a conflicts of law issue as to whether the Utah 
or the Nevada statute of frauds should be applied. The 
property sold is located in Nevada but the Contract was entered 
into, as least in part, in Utah. Nevertheless, because both 
statutes are substantively identical it is unnecessary to 
resolve the issue. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1 (1988). The Nevada statute of frauds 
provides in pertinent part: 
No estate or interest in lands ... shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared ... unless ... by deed or conveyance, in 
writing, subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same.... 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.205 (1987). 
A case closely on point is Goats v. Bayless Markets, 
Inc., 481 P.2d 536 (Ariz. App. 1971). In Goats, a lessor 
leased space for a bakery to the lessees. Upon the lessees1 
default in making payments on the lease, the lessor evicted the 
lessees and retook possession of the bakery. The plaintiff 
claimed to have received an oral assignment of the lease from 
the lessees and brought suit against the lessor for 
conversion. Holding that the alleged oral assignment was 
invalid under the statute of frauds, the court stated: 
With respect to plaintiff's assertion that 
the [lessees] had orally assigned their interest 
as lessees of the Gingham Girl Bakery to 
plaintiff, such action, even if it had taken 
place, could not in any way be binding upon [the 
lessor] without its knowledge and consent since 
the lease in question was one for more than one 
year duration and would therefore be within the 
Statute of Frauds.... 
481 P.2d at 540. Likewise, the alleged oral joint venture 
agreement is in no way binding upon Frontier,, 
Shire and Charboneau alternatively assert that joint 
venture agreements for the purchase of real property need not 
be in writing. Such is true if the agreements merely govern 
-12-
the relationship and obligations as between the purchasing 
joint venturers themselves and do not purport to transfer an 
interest in real property. Such agreements may give one joint 
venturer a claim against another joint venturer for proceeds 
derived from property obtained by one joint venturer in his own 
name on behalf of the joint venture. This is all the cases 
cited by Shire and Charboneau stand for. See Ellingson v. 
Sloan, 527 P.2d 1100 (Ariz. App. 1975); Harestad v. Weitzel, 
536 P.2d 522 (Or. 1975). However, such agreements do not give 
a joint venturer rights against a seller who contracted only 
with another joint venturer. 
Any agreement purporting to transfer an interest in 
real property must be in writing.2 Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1; 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.205. Shire and Charboneau may have a 
claim against Glezos pursuant to the oral joint venture 
agreement but the oral agreement gives them no claim against 
Frontier. 
Furthermore, as Judge Daniels ruled, Glezos did not 
intend the oral joint venture agreement to be an assignment. 
2
 Shire and Charboneau assert that the lower court expressly 
rejected Frontier's assertion that any assignment would have to 
be in writing. This is not completely accurate. The court did 
not expressly rule on the issue. The court's entry of summary 
judgment was based on the grounds that Shire and Charboneau had 
not received an assignment from Glezos. Implicit in this 
ruling is that an assignment would have to be in writing. See 
the portion of the transcript of the hearing containing the 
lower court's order attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
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In the Release of Claims executed by Glezos in settlement of 
the United States District Court action, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum 3, Glezos reserves the right to 
assign his rights to Shire and Charboneau. If Glezos had 
assigned his rights to Shire and Charboneau in the oral joint 
venture agreement a year earlier, he would have no rights left 
to reserve. The oral joint venture agreement does not 
constitute an assignment. 
Shire and Charboneau attempt to muddy the waters in 
this case by arguing that Frontier may have subsequently 
learned of the alleged joint venture agreement because Glezos 
made installment payments due under the contract with checks 
drawn on Shire's bank account. This argument is immaterial. 
Even if Frontier had learned of the alleged oral agreement, 
such knowledge would not create an assignment of Glezos1 
interest to Shire and Charboneau. Without being a party to the 
contract or receiving an assignment of Glezos1 interest, Shire 
and Charboneau have no standing to bring this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the real 
estate sales contract entered into between Frontier and Glezos 
and have not received an assignment from Glezos of his interest 
in the property. Neither can Shire and Charboneau be intended 
beneficiaries of the Contract. Inasmuch as the oral joint 
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venture agreement was not entered into until after the 
Contract, Glezos and Frontier could not have intended to 
benefit Shire and Charboneau. Shire and Charboneau are thus 
not in privity with Frontier and lack standing to challenge the 
liquidated damages provision of the contract. 
This court should affirm the summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint entered by the lower court in this 
action. 
DATED this y day of December, 1989. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
David A. Greenwood 
Marvin D. Bagley 
>rneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
50 South Main Street,'SuiTte 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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This Agreement is made and entered into this 25th day of 
September, 1986, by and between STEVEN T. GLEZOS ("Glezos") and 
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation ("Shire") and BERT 
CHARBONEAU ("Charboneau") by and through their respective 
attorneys with reference to the following facts. 
WHEREAS, Glezos has commenced a legal action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, entitled: Steven T. Glezos, Plantiff, v. Frontier 
Investments, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 85C-1004G (the 
"pending action"), in which action Glezos is seeking to recover 
the sum of approximately $90,000.00 paid to Frontier Investments 
for the purchase of certain real property located in the State 
of Nevada (the "property"); and 
WHEREAS, Charboneau contributed $30,000.00 for the 
purchase of the property and Shire and Glezos also contributed 
j|various sums for the purchase of the property; and 
WHEREAS, Shire, Charboneau and Utah Crossing Ltd. have 
filed a Motion in the pending action seeking leave to intervene 
as Plaintiffs to assert a right to all or a portion of any funds 
'!recovered from Frontier Investments; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Glezos, Shire and Charboneau are entitled to share in 
the proceeds of any judgment or settlement obtained from 
Frontier Investments in the pending action, after deducting 
A
— ^
 0 0 0 1 4 S 
pending action, in the same percentage as their respective 
contributions toward the purchase of the property bear to the 
total amount paid towards purchase of the property. 
Charboneau's share of any settlement or judgment, based upon his 
contribution of $30,000.00, shall be paid to him as soon as 
possible after receipt of funds from Frontier Investments. The 
remainder of the funds received from Frontier Investments shall 
i 
I be placed in an interest-bearing account requiring both the 
signatures of counsel for both Shire and Glezos for any 
withdrawals pending an agreement between Shire and Glezos for 
| the release of such funds. 
2. Any settlement of the pending action by Glezos shall 
require written approval from any two of Glezos, Shire and 
Charboneau. 
3. Shire and Charboneau shall cause the Motion to 
Intervene in the pending action to be withdrawn. 
4. The undersigned attorneys represent and warrant that 
they have the full right and authority from their respective 
clients to execute this Agreement on their behalf. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement the day and date first above written. 
teven T. Glezos 
0001431 
BURBI 
StefelMftftB. M i t c h e l l 
A t t o r n e y s for S h i r e and 
Charboneau 
dd5401a 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAWjffi'Sjt'E^IMSTRfCT 
SKRr&E COUNTY 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE o F ^™^^^7uTTCL^ 
RK 
* * * * * 
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, INC. , a 
Utah corporation and ALBERT 
CHARBONEAU, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a 
Nevada Limited Partnership, 
MARK CHILTON, KATHRYN W. 
CHILTON, ROGET S. TROUNDAY, 
GAIL TROUNDAY, WARD W. CHILTON 
and STEVEN R. TROUNDAY, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 880901734 
* * * * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
June 9, 1989 
ADDENDUM 2 
NORA S. WORTHEN, CSR, RPR 
(801) 535-5344 r^k * ^  - -
are not there and there simply was no rights to begin with. 
And there is no mutuality. It is not an assignment. There 
is no privity of contract. There's just the contractual 
relationship between the parties, and they have no standing 
to bring this action. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Well, I think the critical 
issue is whether there is an assignment or not. I don't 
think I buy your Statute of Frauds argument, or the 
mutuality argument, but the question really is, is there an 
assignment or isn't there. 
I don't think that Shire can sue on this contract 
unless, either they were a party to the contract or an 
assignee of party, and there are cases that only hold that 
they can sue if they are an assignee. And I just can't read 
this agreement, this joint venture agreement to make them an 
assignee. Especially I don't think Glezos thought it was an 
assignment, because a year later when he entered into this 
settlement agreement, he specifically says in there, he, in 
sole discretion, may assign rights to Shire, or may not. So 
I just can't see it as being an assignment without an 
assignment. I don't think Shire or Charboneau can bring the 
action. If he does assign his rights sometime, maybe they 
can, but based on the documents that are now before the 
Court, I think that the Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be granted. 
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"EXHIBIT E 
(Attached to and forming a part of the Real 
Property Purchase Agreement, dated October 
13, 1987, between Frontier Investments, as 
Seller, and Steven T. Glezos, as Buyer.) 
RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE 
THIS RELEASE OF CLAIMS AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE ("Agreement") 
is made and entered into as of the day of November, 1987, 
by and between FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a Nevada limited 
partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "Frontier"), and STEVEN 
T. GLEZOS, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(hereinafter referred to as "Glezos"). 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, Frontier and Glezos entered into that certain Real 
Property Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement") dated 
October 13, 1987, for the purpose of settling the dispute between 
them which is the subject of Civil No. 85C-10046 (the "Action") 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Section 1.5 of the Purchase Agreement requires that 
the 3uyer release the Seller from certain claims and covenant not 
to sue the Seller, as hereinafter set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
promises contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration, Frontier and Glezos agree as follows: 
1. Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement, 
Frontier shall perform its obligations to Glezos pursuant to the 
terms of the Purchase Agreement. 
2. Glezos, for himself and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under him, does hereby release, acquit, and discharge 
Frontier, and all of Frontier's affiliated entities, 
corporations, partnerships, officers, directors, shareholders, 
agents, partners, attorneys, employees, and representatives of 
any nature, and their successors, heirs, and assigns, and each of 
them from claims as follows: 
(a) In the Action, Glezos asserted damage claims of over 
$90,000 relating to purchase agreements for real property in 
Wendover, Nevada. Glezos represents to Frontier that of the 
ADDENDUM 3 
::,cj>nuy i^^j-a. LO r r o m i e r under the disputed contracts, only $11,000 
came from the personal funds of Glezos, and that the remainder 
came either from funds of Albert Charboneau or from funds 
borrowed by Shire Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, from 
l-.'oore Financial with guarantees from C.N. Zundel and Glezos. 
(b) Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all claims 
relating to the $11,000 he personally provided for payments to 
Frontier under the disputed real estate purchase agreements. 
Clezcs foes net intend by giving sucn release to release or 
effect in any way, favorably or unfavorably- any claims which 
Alien Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. may have acainst 
Frontier relating to funds either of them provided for payment to 
Frontier under the disputed real estate agreements. Dy 
mentioning the potential claims of Albert Charboneau and Shire 
Development, Inc. in this release, Glezos does not intend to 
enhance or strengthen those claims in any way or to create claims 
if none exist. Glezos does, however, specifically reserve the 
right, in his sole discretion, to assign to Albert Charboneau 
and/or Shire Development Inc. any claims he asserted in the 
Action relating to funds provided by Albert Charboneau or Shire 
Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier under the real estate 
purchase agreements disputed in the Action. By signing this 
document, Glezos acknowledges that Frontier does not intend to 
enhance or strengthen any potential claims of Albert Charboneau 
or Shire Development, Inc. relating to the subject matter of the 
Action or to create claims if none exist. 
(c) Although Glezos reserves the right to assign to Albert 
Charboneau and/or Shire Development, Inc. any claims Glezos 
asserted in the Action relating to funds provided by Albert 
Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier 
under the real estate purchase agreements disputed in the Action, 
Glezos hereby covenants that he personally will not again sue 
Frontier or any of the other parties named as defendants in the 
Action for claims relating to the subject matter of the Action or 
which arose prior to the date of this Agreement. This covenant 
not to sue is personal to Glezos and is not intended to in any 
way impair the rights, if any, of Albert Charboneau or Shire 
Development, Inc. if Glezos assigns claims to either or both of 
them relating to funds they provided for payment to Frontier 
under the disputed real estate purchase agreements. 
3. The parties hereto warrant and agree in executing this 
Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue that they have relied 
on their own judgment, belief and knowledge and not on the 
representations or statements made by any of the parties released 
or anyone representing them, except such representations as are 
set forth in the Purchase Agreement. 
4. The reservation by Glezos of the alleged claims of 
Albert Charboneau and Shire Development, Inc. against Frontier 
shall not for any purpose- be deemed or argued, to be an admission 
of responsibility or an acknowledgement of the accuracy of any 
allegations made 
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